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I OBJECT YOUR HONOUR! THE MOOT COURT 
PARADIGM IS MOOTABLE 
 
Shreya Atrey* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mooting is traditionally used in law schools to familiarise students with 
real world lawyering in terms of court procedure, drafting submissions and delivering 
oral arguments. The impact of mooting is then directly reflected in the judicial system as 
law students choose to practice law at the Bar. Whilst the stated aim of moot courts is in 
raising standards of the Bar, it becomes crucial to examine the ways in which mooting 
actually contributes in equipping law students with knowledge of the judicial processes. I 
argue that contrary to its pedagogical purposes, mooting in fact reinforces the rigours of 
adversarialism to reproduce the hierarchical and patriarchal aspects of the legal system. 
There is a need to reinvestigate the content and tools of legal pedagogy in relation to 
mooting, so as to enable students to critique legal knowledge from a standpoint of 
legitimation of ideas about law, including institutions of law.  
 
This paper concerns the pedagogic theory of mooting and is thus 
concerned mainly about its normative aspects. The practice of mooting is referred to 
demonstrate how the norms operate in reality and such perspectives are examined in the 
Indian context where mooting in the premier law schools is considered the optimal 
student experience. In as much as the mooting trends in Asia are converging, such 
practices are analysed to better nuance the Indian position. However, since the theoretical 
underpinnings of moot court activities are mostly explored in Western academic 
literature1 rather than in pan-Asian perspective, the paper draws from the vast research 
pool developed in the first world context but applies it with caution to reflect upon the 
Indian context.2  
 
It is important to emphasise here that the lessons from the Indian 
perspective may be instructive for other jurisdictions which battle to create a system of 
practical legal education through mooting which is both enriching for law students and 
worthwhile by itself. On the one hand, the inherently adversarial outlook of mooting 
mirrors current court procedure and highlights the need for institutional reform and on the 
                                                 
*DPhil Candidate in Law (University of Oxford), B.C.L. (University of Oxford), B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) 
(NALSAR University of Law). 
1See Archana Parashar, Feminism in Indian Legal Education in ENGENDERING LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
LOTIKA SARKAR 91 (Amita Dhanda & Archana Parashar ed., 1999) (“…it is undeniable that what happens 
in the Indian universities is inextricably linked to theoretical trends in the first world universities. You can 
call it anything—continuing imperialism of thought, post-colonial condition or globalization—but the fact 
remains that the so-called third world thought is influenced and shaped in relation to European and North 
American theoretical developments.”). 
2Id., 91 (“Whether the theoretical claims [developed in first world] are universalistic, or more recently Post 
Modernist efforts at non-universalism, they are not simply extendable to third world societies.” [emphasis 
supplied]). 
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other hand, the flaws in implementation signify the crisis of utilising mooting as a 
commendable pedagogic tool. Together, both these analyses alert us to the normative and 
functional limitations of mooting, an insight which is useful for every legal education 
system. 
 
Part II of the paper briefly describes the goals of establishing mooting as a 
part of legal education in India. Part III argues that within the normative structure of moot 
courts, its singularly problematic facet lies in maintaining a hierarchical and adversarial 
outlook. It hypothesises that, if students learn as a norm something which requires 
reconstruction, upon becoming a part of the system, they will reinforce the same system 
thereby stifling the possibility of reform. Part IV analyses the central features of mooting 
and offers ways of reconceptualising and strengthening the core practices. Part V 
concludes by highlighting the need to query the pedagogical contours of mooting in 
India—both, normatively and functionally.      
 
II. MOOTING—THE INDIAN ENTERPRISE 
 
At the outset, it is essential to briefly explore the moot court enterprise in 
terms of its stated goals, mechanisms and results. Historically, troubled by the solely 
academic focus of legal education divorced from the practice of the profession, mooting 
was introduced in law schools as a part of practical legal education to break away from 
the monotony of lecture method.3 The purpose of practical legal education, that is to 
teach law students about what lawyers do and to understand lawyers’ professional role in 
the legal system4 reflects in the goal of establishing moot courts as a means of 
‘integration of student learning of theoretical and practical legal knowledge’.5  
 
At its core, mooting is structured as mock court exercises to familiarise 
students with the professional side of law– in the form of court procedures and legal 
advocacy. Axiomatically, it is aimed at professionalising the Bar.6 
 
In the Indian context, after the abandonment of the training requirement 
for law students, the Ahmadi Committee played a major role in theorising upon the need 
for and purposes of mooting.7 The Report of Ahmadi Committee referred to Rule 21 of 
the Bar Council of India Rules of Legal Education (as amended upto November 30, 1998) 
and to Sch. I dealing with the 5-year law course which contains the following directive: 
                                                 
3See Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical-Lawyer School?, 81  U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933); Jerome Frank, A 
Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE LJ 1303 (1947).  
4Frank S. Bloch & M. R. K. Prasad, Institutionalizing a Social Justice Mission for Clinical Legal 
Education: Cross-National Currents from India and the United States, 13 CLINICAL L. REV 165, 166 
(2006). 
5WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 13 
(2007). 
6WILLIAM R. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES xiii-xiv 
(1978). 
7Ahmadi Committee was formed in 1994 at a Conference of the Chief Justices of the High Courts of India 
to suggest appropriate steps to be taken so that the law graduates acquire sufficient experience before they 
become entitled to practice in the courts.  
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“Every university shall endeavour to supplement the lecture method with the case 
method, tutorials and other modern techniques of imparting legal education.” The Report 
recommended that: “This Rule must be amended in a mandatory form and we should 
include problem method, moot courts, mock trials and other aspects in this Rule and 
make them compulsory.” This laid down the foundation for the Law Commission to 
recommend legal education reforms including the introduction of mandatory moot courts 
as a part of legal curriculum through its 184th Law Commission Report in 2002.8 It was 
also actively recommended in the Bar Council of India initiative of formulating Four 
Papers (as suggestive of model reforms)9 and by the National Knowledge Commission.10 
Even the Supreme Court of India has been aware of the need to acclimatise students to 
court procedure through mooting. In V. Sudheer v. Bar Council of India, a case which 
challenged the Bar Council of India Training Rules, 1995 amending the training 
requirements for lawyers entering legal profession under the Advocates Act 1961, the 
Supreme Court noted with affirmation the developments of new techniques in preparing 
young lawyers.11 It reiterated the report of Ahmadi Committee in relation to the need 
“provide for compulsory training to young advocates entering the portals of the 
courtrooms” through improvements in legal education including introduction of moot 
courts and mock trials.12 These developments indicate a clear and growing consensus for 
mooting to be a part of legal education in India.13 
 
However, even after the proposed reforms and the assumed importance of 
mooting in India, it is still not a mandatory part of the legal curriculum, and it primarily 
exists in the form of ‘extra-curricular’ external competitions. Law schools have devised 
internal mechanisms for selecting students for these external competitions – through a 
yearly competition, ad hoc selections for particular moots or even a selection based on 
GPAs. In the absence of a substantive course on mooting, these ad hoc competitions 
sometimes remain the law students’ only rendezvous with the judicial procedure (other 
than internships) during their law school lives.  
 
                                                 
8Law Commission of India, 184th Law Commission of India Report on ‘The Legal Education and 
Professional Training and Proposals for Amendments to the Advocates Act, 1961 and the University 
Grants Commission Act, 1956’, December 20, 2002, available at 
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/184threport-PartI.pdf (Last visited on March 31, 2013).  
9See Bar Council of India, Bar Council of India Rules of Legal Education, Part IV, Sch. II, Compulsory 
Clinical Courses: 24. Moot court exercise and Internship, available at 
http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/BCIRulesPartIV.pdf (Last visited on 
September 25, 2009). 
10National Knowledge Commission (NKC), Report of the Working Group on Legal Education, ¶ 2.7, 
available at http://www.knowledgecommission.gov.in/downloads/documents/wg_legal.pdf (Last visited on 
March 31, 2013). The NKC was set up on June 13, 2005 as a high-level advisory body to the Prime 
Minister of India, with the objective of transforming India into a knowledge society.  
111999 (3) SCC 176, 210-211 (“Participation in moot courts, mock trials, and debates must be made 
compulsory.”).  
12Id.  
13Bloch & Prasad, supra note 4.  
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III. MUCH OBLIGED, YOUR LORDSHIPS—THE ADVERSARIAL 
ROOTS OF THE INDIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND 
MOOTING 
 
This part undertakes the normative inquiry into how mooting reinforces 
contested stereotypes in litigation. It is argued that by failing to challenge those 
stereotypes, legal pedagogy colludes with the present system in sustaining its worst 
practices in the judicial arena.  
 
A. ADVERSARIAL BAIT IN THE JUDICIAL CONTEXT 
 
One of the most pressing issues lurking in the Indian judicial system is of 
delay in justice delivery mainly due to backlog of cases or the so-called ‘docket 
explosion’.14 This has often been directly linked to the inefficiency and failures of the 
adversarial system, which has failed in meeting the demands of a modern and progressive 
judicial system. V.S. Elizabeth specifically compares delay and arrears to the adversarial 
method which was supplemented and supplanted in the older days with more 
reconciliatory methods.15 A need to revert to some of these older and now innovative 
methods has its basis in realising the downfalls of the adversarial method specifically 
because of its lengthy and convoluted procedure mechanism. Even the Indian justices 
have articulated its grave concerns with the adversarial system. Former Chief Justice 
Y.K. Sabharwal has specifically linked what he calls as the phenomena of ‘delayed 
justice’ to the adversarial system which he describes as “The Courts and Tribunals 
adjudicate and resolve the dispute through adversarial mode of dispute resolution. 
Litigation as a method of dispute resolution leads to a win-lose situation. Associated with 
this win-lose situation is the growth of animosity between the parties, which is not 
congenial to a peaceful society.”16 Former Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan enlists the 
characteristics of the adversarial method which he believes are in need for reform in order 
to strengthen our judicial system. He states that “Civil litigation has an inherently 
                                                 
14Dr. Manmohan Singh described the arrears and backlogs of cases as the “scourge” of the Indian legal 
system at The Conference of Chief Ministers and Chief Justices (August 16, 2009). See Press Information 
Bureau, Prime Minister's speech at the Joint Conference of Chief Ministers and Chief Justices, August 16, 
2009, available at: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=51878 (Last visited on November 10, 
2013). 
15 V.S. Elizabeth, The Indian Legal System, IALS Conference: Learning from Each Other: Enriching the 
Law School Curriculum in an Interrelated World, available at 
http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/enriching/elizabeth.pdf (Last visited on March 31, 2013) (“[I]n the context 
of India today some of the most critical issues before the Government and thus, the judiciary, are the 
questions of delay in justice because of the backlog of cases...[i]n the pre-colonial days the administration 
of justice was not based on adversarial system, but on an adjudicatory process that sought through 
arbitration and negotiation to bring about a compromise. This was available at the local level and did not 
involve distance or financial expenses as the present system involves.”). See also V. R. Krishna Iyer, The 
Syndrome of Judicial Arrears, THE HINDU December 2,  2009 (“More than all else, delay of dockets and 
Himalayan arrears frustrate the hope of justice...[t]he Bar, an indispensable factor in the adversarial system, 
is too expensive for the lowly and the forlorn.”). 
16Y. K. Sabharwal, Delayed Justice- Justice Sobhag Mal Memorial Jain Lecture, July 25, 2006, available at 
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/speeches/speeches_2006/delayed%20justice.pdf (Last visited on March 
31, 2013). 
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adversarial character and is widely perceived in society as a tool of confrontation and 
unnecessary harassment. Especially in instances where parties are otherwise well-known 
to each other, their involvement in lengthy and acrimonious civil suits can do irreparable 
damage to their mutual relationships.”17 As Justice S.B. Sinha points out, “The world has 
experienced that adversarial litigation is not the only means of resolving disputes. 
Congestion in court rooms, lack of manpower and resources in addition with delay, cost, 
and procedure speak out the need of better options, approaches and avenues.”18 Most 
High Courts in India have also identified the inadequacies of the adversarial techniques. 
The High Courts of Jharkhand and Uttaranchal have opined that the adversarial system 
has simply failed in delivering justice whilst the High Courts of Bombay, Chhattisgarh, 
Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Kolkata, Madras, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa have expressed 
that the present system is not satisfactory.19 Similarly, the apex court in the case of Ram 
Chandra v. State of Haryana20 described the state of Indian litigation as: 
 
“[T]here is an unfortunate tendency for a Judge presiding over a trial to 
assume the role of referee or umpire and to allow the trial to develop into a 
contest between the prosecution and the defence with the inevitable 
distortion flowing from combative and competitive elements entering the 
trial procedure.” 
 
To address this problem of mounting arrears and to improve judicial 
efficiency, the larger agenda of judicial reforms includes addressing judges’ competency, 
judicial appointments, physical infrastructure as well as use of advanced technology and 
judicial accountability.21 Whilst each of these has been rigorously debated, the urgent 
need for case management22 through an improved adversarial system is particularly 
                                                 
17K.G. Balakrishnan, Former Chief Justice of India, Judicial Reforms in India: Keynote address delivered at 
the Indo-EU Business Forum, London (October 31, 2008) available at 
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/speeches/speeches_2008/31[1].10.08_judicial_reforms_-london.pdf (Last 
visited on March 31, 2013). 
18S.B.  Sinha, Former Justice of Supreme Court of India, ADR and Access to Justice: Issues and 
Perspectives, available at http://www.hcmadras.tn.nic.in/jacademy/articles/ADR-
%20Justice%20SB%20Sinha.pdf (Last visited on October 19, 2013). See also Pratiksha Baxi, Access to 
Justice and Rule-of-[Good] Law: The Cunning of Judicial Reform in India (2007) Working Paper 
Commissioned by the Institute of Human Development, New Delhi, On behalf of the UN Commission on the 
Legal Empowerment of the Poor, available at 
http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/reports/National%20Consultation%20Reports/Country%20Files/1
2_India/12_4_Access_to_Justice.pdf (Last visited on March 31, 2013). 
19Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Report of Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice 
System: Chairman Dr. Justice V. S. Malimath, Volume I, 27 (2003) (‘Malimath Committee Report’). 
20AIR 1981 SC 1036. 
21See generally Robert Moog, Indian Litigiousness and the Litigation explosion: Challenging the Legend, 
33 ASIAN SURVEY 1136 (1993). 
22Hiram E. Chodosh et al, Reform of the Indian Civil Justice System: Limitation and Preservation of the 
Adversarial Process, 30 J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 62 (1998) (“The objectives of cases management are to 
establish judicial responsibility for the otherwise substantially party-controlled, adversarial preparations of 
civil cases for trial. Specifically, case management is designed to reduce dilatory, frivolous, inefficient, and 
protracted litigation practices and to replace party controlled litigation processes with judge-controlled, 
sequential steps in the life of a civil proceeding.”). 
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significant, as it relates to the very performance of law at courts.23 Interestingly, since 
pure forms of adversarial or inquisitorial systems have been out of vogue, judicial reform 
may be driven towards revamping the adversarial model, as opposed to rejecting it in 
toto, mainly by reducing the confrontational element within it.24 The tone for reforms is 
thus set by critically examining the adversarial system for its qualititative benefits and 
downfalls and introducing suitable modifications and supplications where necessary. For 
example, learnings from other areas like mediation view adversarial technique as: 
 
“Effective reform lies in measures which promote both efficiency and 
ethics. The adversarial system is the appropriate method in a number of 
situations especially those needing authoritative interpretation or 
establishment of rights or which manifest severe negotiating imbalance. It 
is also required as a last resort of resolution. However, its indiscriminate 
and unvarying application across a broad band of conflict is a major cause 
of the several ills plaguing the legal system. The indiscriminate use of the 
adversarial method also raises fundamental ethical problems for members 
of the legal profession, characterized as a learned and a noble one. The 
system places a premium on winning, not on establishing the truth or 
finding the best solution. This leads to repeated use of the legal process, 
aggravation of conflict, and worsening of relationships. Hidden under 
generalizations and defenses are fundamental ethical issues relating to our 
conduct, the behaviour we promote and the dichotomy between theory and 
practice of law.”25 
 
Thus, adversarial systems like Australia have demonstrated signs of 
imbibing inquisitorial features whilst Italy and France—traditionally known to be purely 
inquisitorial are adopting adversarial techniques and as Justice Kirby explains:  
 
“In reality, pure adversarial and inquisitorial systems are now hard to find. 
Most jurisdictions have a mixture of the two techniques. Some features of 
the inquisitorial system have become grafted onto court systems in 
Australia, such that pro-active judges are much more vigorously 
controlling, and directing, the efficient resolution of cases. In Italy, which 
is predominantly an inquisitorial system, aspects of the adversarial system 
have been introduced into the procedures of criminal trials. One study 
discovered that passive defence lawyers and bureaucratic prosecutors of 
the civil law tradition were culturally ill-suited to the new adversarial 
contest. They were not disposed to fight cases nor motivated to seek their 
                                                 
23See for reforms in criminal litigation, Malimath Committee Report, supra note 19, 24 (“As the adversarial 
system does not impose a positive duty on the judge to discover truth he plays a passive role. The system is 
heavily loaded in favour of the accused and is insensitive to the victims’ plight and rights...Over the years 
taking advantage of several lacunae in the adversarial system large number of criminals are escaping 
convictions. This has seriously eroded the confidence of the people in the efficacy of the System.”). 
24Sriram Panchu, On the Mediation Process, Paper for the conference sponsored by the Law Commission 
of India on ADR/ Mediation in New Delhi on May 3-4, 2003, available at 
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/adr_conf/sriram17.pdf (Last visited on  March 13, 2013). 
25Id.  
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efficient resolution. I suspect that this is not a problem for Indian or 
Australian advocates. Nonetheless, in Federal and State jurisdictions, and 
in a myriad of tribunals in Australia, new procedures have been 
introduced, in the nature of "case management" to enhance court control 
over litigation.” 26 
 
In the light of these developments, the decadal Indian policy has shown 
signs of graduating from a cut-throat adversarial legal system to a more collaborative and 
conducive one.27 In this sense, as these reforms finally come to be realised, the legal 
education should be complementarily progressing and advancing the cause. Since 
mooting and judicial procedure are inextricably linked, it is important that mooting as a 
pedagogic tool is examined and corrected for its inherent and functional flaws arising 
from imitating the real system itself. This paper seeks to demystify the adversarialism 
surrounding the judicial system by reverse engineering the process and spearheading this 
reform at the legal education site. The next section explains how adversarialism has 
embodied itself in mooting. 
  
B. ADVERSARIAL BAIT IN INDIAN MOOTING 
 
The adversarial framework, which dominates the judicial side of the law, 
has permeated through other institutions28 and dominates the way in which students 
understand law and legal systems.29 Described as ‘getting on your feet and getting grilled 
over hot coals while speaking’,30 moot court reinforces the rigours of the imperial 
heritage of adversarialism within the judicial system and in methods of teaching legal 
education.31 The resulting causality of this ‘culture of adversarialism’32 is 
counterproductive to seeking reforms in the institutions of law, making litigation more 
suited to our times and promoting an overall culture of equality and integrity in the 
                                                 
26Justice Michael Kirby, India & Australia: A Neglected Legal Relationship and a Plan of Action (Indo-
Australian Public Policy Conference, New Delhi, India from October 23-24, 1996), available at 
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/kirbyj/kirbyj_india.htm (Last visited 
on March 31, 2013).  
27‘National Mission for Delivery of Justice and Legal Reform, Towards Timely Delivery of Justice to All A 
Blueprint for Judicial Reforms 2009 – 2012, 18 (“The need of the hour is to depart from the traditional 
adversarial case management practices which had left the pace of litigation primarily in the hands of legal 
practitioners. This can be achieved by adopting modern and efficient case management practices.”); B. 
Lokur Madan, Judge, Delhi High Court, Case Management and Court Management, available at 
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/adr_conf/Justice_Lokur.pdf (Last visited on March 31, 2013) (“for the 
last decade or so, the effort seems to have shifted from tribunalising justice to reducing the adversarial role 
that litigants play.”).  
28See DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM DEBATE TO DIALOGUE (1998). 
29Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of 
Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 515, 526 (2007).  
30Peter F. Lake, Insights on Legal Education: When Fear Knocks: The Myths and Realities of Law School, 
29 STETSON L.REV. 1015, 1032 (2000). 
31It is important to note that the since our legal system is a British legacy, it does not come to an end with 
the formal end of colonial rule. See DANIEL LERNER, THE TRANSFER OF INSTITUTIONS (William B. 
Hamilton ed., 1964). 
32Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 
38 WM & MARY L. REV. 5, 11 (1996). 
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judicial process. However, in as much as the moot court perpetuates this culture as ought, 
we operate cyclically, progressing nowhere.33 Therefore, the concern with mooting is its 
overemphasised and unchallenged faith in adversarialism.34 Lord Brougham strikes the 
core: 
 
“An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the 
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and 
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, 
to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must 
not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring 
upon others.”35 
 
The modern day version of this dated notion, called ‘zealous advocacy’ 
has become a powerful prototype for a lawyer.36 That has become the end in itself, not 
just sidelining other duties37 of a lawyer but observing legal representation of client to 
win the case as the paramount duty.38 Detachment from any other moral or ethical 
consideration assumes that the only ethics involved in lawyering is in defending the 
client. Detachment is further encouraged in moot court competitions where victorious 
teams are those best able to argue both sides of the case.39 The greatness of 
argumentation is assessed from the ability to champion a cause detached from personal 
beliefs. This denies real and practical opportunity of making qualitative judgements about 
different sides and advocacy choices which lie therein. Further, it makes different sides 
appear as rivals rather than as parties to a claim which needs to be clarified, negotiated 
and resolved. It almost forces the students to “argue in oppositional modes, to see black 
or white, to resist nuance and complexity, and at worst, to be uncivil to each other”.40 
 
                                                 
33Gerald Korngold, Legal Education for Non-Litigators: The Role of the Law Schools and the Practicing 
Bar, 30 NYL SCH. L. REV. 621-623 (1985). 
34Id., 622. 
35CAROLINE, TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE Vol. 3 (1874). 
36Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Zealous Representation: The Pervasive Ethic in UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 71 (2004).  
37The Bar Council of India under the Advocates Act outlines duties toward clients, opponents, colleagues, 
and the courts. See Advocates Act, 1961, § 49 (1)(C). 
38C.f. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 603 (1985) 
(“There is no professional duty ... which compels an advocate ... to secure success in any cause, just or 
unjust; and when so instructed, if he believes it to be intended to gain an unrighteous object, he ought to 
throw up the cause, and retire from all connection with it, rather than thus be a participator in other men's 
sins.”) (citing G. SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 100-101 (1860)). 
39The sentiments of the British Barrister Cross are similar: “Certainly I have seldom felt better pleased than 
when I persuaded three out of five law Lords [i.e., the court] to come to a decision which I was convinced 
was wrong ...” See Warren Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client’s Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1979) 
(quoting Rt. Hon. Lord Cross of Chelsea). This detachment should be considered differently from the value 
in being aware of both sides of the case to respond to counter-arguments. 
40Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything: The Lawyer as Problem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 905, 909 (2000). 
 9 
What is problematic is the associated assumption that ‘all disputes are best 
resolved by objective advocacy in a hierarchical, competitive, win/lose approach’.41 
However, most often, client satisfaction and overall success of a court decision is not 
captured in the win/loss statistic. In fact, a win has often been described as imprecise 
justice.42 In evaluating the overall ‘justice’ component of a case, factors unrelated to the 
outcome have assumed greater importance, such as, having a chance to state one’s case 
and to be treated with dignity and respect, or the overall fairness of the process.43 None of 
these are adequately captured or learnt during moots due to its adversarial alliance.  
 
One of the most notable manifestations of adversarialism is the 
preparation of moot court competitions like ‘championship fights’.44 There is clamoured 
emphasis on absolute recalcitrance because retreat is impossible.45 For example, a mooter 
might concede to have wrongly answered a question and then go ahead to give the correct 
answer but may well be penalised for ‘not sticking to his ground’.46 
 
While the adversarial archetype continues to remain lawyers’ ‘standard 
philosophical map’,47 it is timely to realise the need of a paradigm shift in judicial 
procedure. To this end, moot courts can play a significant role in spearheading the 
reform. Even as one may not completely abandon the adversarialism in courts as it 
sharpens analytical skills and helps reach justice by analysing opposite arguments of 
adversaries,48 it remains problematic in as much as it reinforces the sense of ritualised 
combat.49 
 
C. THE BOILERPLATE EFFECT 
                                                 
41Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman’s Lawyering Process, 1 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S LJ 39, 52-53 (1985); Polly Beth Proctor, Toward Myths and Mythology: Applying a 
Feminist Critique to Legal Education to Effectuate a Socialization of Both Sexes in Law School 
Classrooms, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S LJ 577, 596  (2004) (“...emphasis on argument, debate, threats, hidden 
information, deception, lies, persuasion, declarations, and toughness.”). 
42John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise—The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 NW. UL 
REV. 750 (1964) (unravelling the parameters of imprecise justice). 
43TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 178 (1990). 
44Peter T. King, Legal Education at Notre Dame Law School: The Lasting Significance of its Catholic 
Dimension, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 997 (1994). Although this term was spoken of in a different 
context, it is aptly applies in the context of moot court competitions.  
45Paul M. Pruitt, The Life and Times of Legal Education in Alabama, 1819-1897: Bar Admissions, Law 
Schools, and the Profession, 49 ALA. L. REV, 281, 301 (1997). 
46King, supra note 44, 997-98. (King has a very interesting example from his own adversarial mooting 
experiences where he described the overbearing assertiveness in formulating arguments, “I was interning in 
a New York law firm and was assigned to work with a law student from New York University named Rudy 
Guiliani... One job we were given was to write a memorandum establishing that issuing municipal bonds in 
Mississippi was not violative of that state's constitution. When Rudy read my sections of the memorandum, 
he told me how surprised he was by the certitude and forcefulness of my arguments.”). 
47Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. LJ 29, 43-48 (1982).  
48Sturm & Guinier, supra note 29, 529 (“Adversarialism is valuable for “sharpening the mind in order to 
narrow it” but it pushes aside other potentially important legal approaches including efforts to problem 
solve in light of the relevant social, political or economic context. It also discourages students from 
grappling with the moral values implicated by a problem.”). 
49Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STANFORD L. REV. 1299, 
1339 (1998). 
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As articulated by Worden: “moot court reifies a particular vision of the 
real world and prepares us to act within that reification”.50 It is then worthwhile to query 
the normative structure of mooting to construct a vision which is worth being reified. 
Consider two examples in this regard. In the Iraqi law school moot court curriculum, the 
final session of a moot court exercise is conducted as a demonstration, committed to 
make clinical pedagogy less hostile.51 Mindful that students can mistake the demo as the 
‘correct method’, it is only suggestive in nature, leaving the students to choose from 
different styles, including their own.52 Importantly, the emphasis is maintained on 
breaking through the passivity of learning the law and to create a cadre of lawyers who 
could challenge preconceived notions associated with the judicial arena.53 Also consider 
the Chinese model, wherein moot courts are made far less adverse by organising them 
around large groups (as in-course exercises) to collaboratively spot issues, analyse facts, 
draft documents, construct legal arguments and elect their representatives to present their 
arguments, under the supervision of the professors.54 Although moots are barely a decade 
old in China, yet their approach appears far more conducive to student learning than its 
counterparts.55 Both the Iraqi and Chinese models represent a version of mooting 
pedagogy which is worth being reified in other jurisdictions.  
 
Mooting in India reflects competitive, individualistic and adversarial 
perspectives of the judicial side of law. Within the formative structure of moot court, the 
most problematic aspect lies in perpetuating as a norm the prototypical characteristics of 
lawyering traditionally associated with maleness.56 After a discerning analysis of cases, 
preparing articulate briefs and withstanding a fierce moot court round, mooters remain 
within the paradigm of being judged for their ‘male voice’.57 More often than not, a 
young mooter astonishingly learns judge’s discontentment over her courtroom attire 
being too western or too traditional.58 The criticism over appropriate attire, a throaty 
                                                 
50K. C. Worden, Overshooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of Legal Education, 34 AM. UL REV. 
1141, 1149 (1985). 
51Haider Ala Hamoudi, Toward a Rule of Law Society In Iraq: Introducing Clinical Legal Education into 
Iraqi Law Schools, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 112, 125 (2005). 
52Id., 126.   
53Id. 
54Mao Ling, Clinical Legal Education and the Reform of the Higher Legal Education System in China, 30 
FORDHAM INT’L LJ 421, 427 (2007). See Lingyun Gao, What Makes a Lawyer in China? The Chinese 
Legal Education System after China’s Entry into the WTO, 10 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DIS. RES. 197 
(2002). 
55Zou Keyuan, Professionalising Legal Education in the People’s Republic of China, 7 SING. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 159, 161-163 (2003). 
56S.P. Sathe, Gender, Constitution and the Courts in ENGENDERING LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LOTIKA 
SARKAR 117 (Amita Dhanda & Archana Parashar ed., 1999) (“The legal profession has always been a 
bastion of male dominance.”). 
57“Male voice” rationality is the traditional notion of thought process associated with logic, objectivity, 
dissociation, detachment, all of which are valued above passion, interconnected and subjective thinking, 
morality, building relationships and associations. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 24-35 (1982).  
58Worden, supra note 50, 1149. (Worden reflects the harsh reality by a narrative of her own experience: “I 
could not believe that success in moot court depended on total conformance to a fossilized standard of 
appearance and conduct. Somehow, within that standard, one’s neckline is a crucial feature of legitimacy! 
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voice or a visible personality in a courtroom reinforce both patriarchal and classist 
tendencies in litigation.59 It is as if we seek to impose the persona of a barrister as 
traditionally associated with upper class Englishmen. 
 
Aggression, willingness to fight, emotional detachment, and exaggerated 
bravado are not universal traits.60 While those traits may not always and necessarily be 
male, we must envision the judicial process to be more inclusive and embracing of other 
kinds of styles and qualities.61 Although individuals can develop themselves in a manner 
so as to assume the attitude of social groups,62 for example students can mimic maleness 
if they aspire to be successful litigators; this trade-off in identity can be crippling.63 Those 
who do not identify with the adversarial nature of proceedings in terms of its abstract as 
opposed to contextual reasoning may experience dissonance and disengagement.64 
Indeed, if survival by disenchanted groups of aspiring judicial persons65 is only about 
‘playing the game’,66 we must rethink the judicial system we try to impersonate in 
mooting.67  
 
Designed to distil everything into black-white or wrong-right, by the very 
nature of it, winners emerge raving about the moot court exercise. Indeed ‘many students 
are excited to have the opportunity to argue like lawyers … almost all students come 
away feeling that it was a high point of their first year’.68 But success may come at the 
cost of reproducing the culture of competition and conformity.69 It may also come at the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Scoop neck, v-neck, ruffles and clinging sweaters, are all unacceptable: they are too feminine, and hence, 
“unprofessional.” On the other hand, men’s neckties are too masculine, too severe, and, therefore, equally 
taboo. The best bet seems to be a large (but not too large) soft bow (feminine) tied at the neck (masculine) 
which calls as little attention as possible to the chest beneath it. The implicit patriarchal message is that 
prospective female attorneys must silence their “female voice,” but should not try or expect to be like men 
either. The message is a variation of the self/other conflict: “Be like us, but not totally; join our game, play 
by our rules . . . but not on our team, and not on their team. It is a catch-22.”). 
59Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce Social 
Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFFALO L. REV. 1155, 1156 (2008). 
60See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 
31-38 (1982).  
61S.P. Sathe, Legal Profession—Its Contribution to Social Change: A Survey of the Pune City Bar, 13 
INDIAN COUNCIL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH-RESEARCH ABSTRACTS 117 (1992). 
62See PETER WOODS, SOCIOLOGY AND THE SCHOOL: AN INTERACTIONIST VIEWPOINT 2 (1983). 
63Lani Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Role Models, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S LJ 93, 94 (1990-91).  
64Roberta M. Hall & Bernice R. Sandler, A Chilly Climate in the Classroom in BEYOND SEX ROLES 503 
(2008); Lani Guinier, Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. 
PA. L. REV.  1, 65 (1994).  
65There may be a broad array of persons besides litigators who wish to be a part of the judicial system not 
just as an adversary. Judicial clerks, researchers, in fact judges themselves will embody this group.  
66Guinier, supra note 63, 82.  
67PARASHAR, supra note 1, 101. (“But if law is to be something more than a legitimator of status quo it 
must be important for the members of the profession as well as academicians at least to inculcate habits of 
self-reflectivity in the construction of legal knowledge.”). 
68LOUIS J. SIRICO, TEACHING ORAL ARGUMENT, PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 
17 (1998).   
69STURM & GUINIER, supra note 29, 519 (“By culture we mean the incentive structures and peer pressure, 
dominant rituals and unspoken habits of thought that construct and then define the interpersonal, 
institutional and cognitive behaviours and beliefs of members of the educational community.”). 
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altar of hiding the proclivity towards speaking and furthering uncertain ideas and giving 
up the enthusiasm in experimenting and exploring.70 It might engender loss of good 
litigating skills helpful in the future since good litigators require creative thinking and 
capacity to challenge the status quo.  
 
As Bourdieu saw it, educational pedagogy works to create a collective 
attitude that causes individuals to docilely accept their place within the greater social 
structure, without question.71 Described as ‘exposition in the grand manner’,72 the moot 
court imbues us with a sense of unquestioningly embracing the law’s aristocratic ideals 
with ‘structural subordination’73 manifested in the judicial process. Bourdieu has argued 
that academics have a moral obligation to study how educational institutions replicate this 
structural subordination.74 In this regard, moots should play a significant role in judicial 
reforms by way of reverse engineering, i.e. introducing reform through legal education 
aspiring to change how the judicial process ought to be.75 The next part investigates what 
needs to be re-examined and what can be recommended as the ought in mooting 
pedagogy.  
 
D. COUNSEL PLEADS IGNORANCE?—RESPONDING TO EXPERIENTIAL 
LIMITATIONS OF MOOTING  
 
As Younger observes, clinics like moot courts can work as ‘incentive to 
master the law library, [but] at worst...seedbeds from which sloppy or incorrect work 
habits grow’.76 If either is possible, it is worthwhile to scrutinise the experiential flaws of 
mooting which may instil incorrect working habits in future litigators. This Part seeks to 
reconstruct some of the central features of mooting for serving its stated aim of 
adequately equipping law students with practical training for real courtroom experience. 
 
First, there must be a renewed focus on presenting creative and coherent 
legal arguments comprehensively. This includes capacities for developing cogency in 
speech, articulacy in answering, a composed demeanour, comprehensibility in navigating 
through contentions and above all, the content.77 At the same time, there cannot be 
                                                 
70Id., 530 (“Many students feel constrained from initiating difficult yet important discussions that will not 
advance the discrete goals of conveying verbal mastery to win the argument.”). 
71PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION, SOCIETY AND CULTURE 
31-35 (1990). Although Bourdieu wrote in the context of French legal education, his critique is useful from 
the standpoint of advocacy against the implicit ways in which the legal education permeates inequality 
within legal institutions.  
72See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 24 
(1983). 
73ELLIOT B. WEININGER, ‘FOUNDATIONS OF PIERRE BOURDIEU’S CLASS ANALYSIS 118 (Erik Olin Wright 
ed., 2005). 
74J.D. Wacquant, Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu’s Sociology in AN 
INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 14 (2008). 
75PARASHAR, supra note 1, 103. (“A radically restructured legal education is the only way of realistically 
achieving such a transformation [in legal system]”) (emphasis supplied). 
76Judith T. Younger, Legal Education: An Illusion, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (1991).  
77Alex Kozinski, In Praise of Moot Court - Not!, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 178, 183 (1997). 
 13 
excessive weight given to stylistic concerns,78 where argumentation in a hurried and 
complicated prose is equated to fluency, and a deep and heavy (male) voice is all that 
constitutes persuasiveness. Legal analysis must be declared pivotal, not just in mooting 
theory but also in practice.  
 
Secondly, the use of precedents and authorities need to be critically 
examined. With judges asking at each point ‘what’s your authority’79, there is a need to 
both undercut the inclination to look only for cases greatly similar to moot problems or to 
avoid any adverse precedent. Whilst moot problems are framed around unsettled 
questions of law or fact, the reason for re-mooting these controversial legal and factual 
contexts is to cultivate the proper use of precedents. This exercise lies at the core of 
judicial process wherein litigators and judges use or negate the impact of precedents, 
doing so only after engaging with precedents.80 Evidently, if the only judicial choice lies 
in the decided case law, there is little a lawyer can contribute to in the judicial decision-
making. In this sense, moot courts cannot just alert students to the existence of precedents 
(just as the lecture or case method does) but develop skills in utilising them.81 Without a 
carefully considered pedagogic theory of the use of precedents in mooting, this crucial 
element in legal training will remain tentative.   
 
Thirdly, we need to address Dauphinais’ concern that bodily-kinesthetic 
intelligence82 involving acting skills including facial expressions, posture, gestures, eye 
contact, and voices are disproportionately relevant in mooting.83 This is coupled with the 
fact that most of the argumentation is reduced to rhetorical harangue.84 Divergence from 
the adversarial, gladiator style mooting such as more deferent and supplicatory methods, 
need to be considered.85 Although the image of the gladiator style lawyer is not altogether 
false, yet, the actual courtroom is far more detached than the debate-style hangover 
witnessed during moots. For instance, in real courtrooms, legal briefs assume greater 
significance than the very impressive repartee of advocates during oral submissions.86 
Prizing bodily-kinesthetic intelligence may lead to undervaluing of logical, linguistic, or 
interpersonal intelligences which are also useful in lawyering.  
 
                                                 
78Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Lawyer as Teacher: the Role of Education, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 359, 388 
(1998).  
79Eleanor Wong, Designing a Legal Skills Curriculum For an Asian Law School: Lessons in Adaptation, 1 
ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 15 (2005) (emphasising the culture of ‘legal proof’).  
80Alex Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff: How You Too Can...Lose Your Appeal, BYU L. REV. 325 (1992) (“Each 
case is different insofar as the facts are concerned. Where the lawyer can really help the judges--and his 
client—is by knowing the record and explaining how it dovetails with the various precedents.”); Ronald 
Dworkin, Integrity in Law in LAW’S EMPIRE 24-29, 225-75  (1986).  
81See RICHARD K. NEUMANN, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING (2005) (explaining how to juggle 
between different levels of proof). 
82See HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES 226-230 (1983). 
83Kirsten A. Dauphinais, Valuing and Nurturing Multiple Intelligences in Legal Education: A Paradigm 
Shift, 11 WASH. & LEE RACE AND ETHNIC ANC. LJ 1, 11 (2005).  
84Willem J. Witteveen, Reading Vico for the School of Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197, 1213 (2008).  
85See James R. P. Ogloff, More Than “Learning to Think like a Lawyer:” The Empirical Research on Legal 
Education, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 73 (2000).  
86Kozinski, supra note 77, 186 (“By contrast, oral arguments in real cases rely heavily on the briefs.”). 
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Fourthly, moot problems must rekindle the interest in mastering the facts. 
Currently, problems are largely set around pre-packaged sets of facts from which the law 
students must deduce a legal principle and debate on policy arguments and merits. The 
emphasis on facts is minimal, focus being on on legal arguments.87 Students often begin 
by asking if the Court is ‘well versed with the facts of the case’ so that they may argue on 
law.88 Axiomatically, moot courts are obsessively structured around policy arguments 
presented before the highest courts.89 As the highest court which largely functions as an 
appellate body, facts are not supposed to be in dispute.90 As Kozinski observes: 
 
“There is a quaint notion out there that facts don’t matter on appeal – 
that’s where you argue about the law; facts are for sissies and trial courts. 
The truth is much different. The law doesn’t matter a bit, except as it 
applies to a particular set of facts.” 
 
This all recreates the same case method of teaching, where most students 
will remember the international law induction into municipal law pursuant to Vishaka v. 
State of Rajasthan91 but none might recall Bhanwari Devi.92 In which case, moot court 
becomes yet another instance of presenting briefs on merits (just as scholarly articles) 
devoid of factual background or socio-economic and political context, different from 
examinations only to the extent that it is vocal. On the other hand, in the real courtroom, 
                                                 
87David Simon Sokolow, From Kurosawa to (Duncan) Kennedy: The Lessons of Rashomon for Current 
Legal Education, WIS. L. REV. 969, 974 (1991) (“When we drafted a briefing problem for moot court, we 
recognized that the students were likely to give short shrift to the statement of facts.  How could we impress 
on the students the crucial role lawyers' interpretation of facts plays in persuading the court that they should 
prevail?”); KOZINSKI, supra note 77, 188 (“Moot court competitions perpetuate this misconception by 
providing little or no training in dealing with what is normally the most important aspect of any case: the 
record.”) [Although I refer to Judge Alex Kozinski at various points for his valuable critique of the moot 
court institution, he only makes his criticism to the extent that moot court does not teach the students about 
the real courtroom procedure and working (“While moot court may be fun now, there ain’t nothing like the 
real thing.”) KOZINSKI, supra note 77, 197. However, I argue that the real court room itself needs to be 
revamped to address the crippling downsides of the judicial system, and in as much as moot court tries to 
replicate and teach such a system, it can neither be educative nor reformative]. 
88Keith A. Findley, The Pedagogy of Innocence: Reflections on the Role of Innocence Projects in Clinical 
Legal Education, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 231, 242 (2006); C.f. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: 
BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS 4 (1996) (“The appellate lawyer deals primarily with law, not facts 
....”). 
89See for Australia, Duncan Bentley, Mooting in an Undergraduate Tax Program, 7 LEGAL EDUCATION 
REVIEW 98, 113 (1996); for UK, JOHN SNAPE & GARY WATT, THE CAVENDISH GUIDE TO MOOTING 20 
(2000); for USA, William H Kenety, Observations on Teaching Appellate Advocacy, 45 J. LEG. EDUC. 582, 
584 (1995). 
90KOZINSKI, supra note 80, 330.  
91AIR SC 3011 1997. 
92Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan is a seminal decision delivered by the Indian Supreme Court significant for 
explicitly dealing with sexual harassment by drawing from international law incorporated in CEDAW 
which was not legislatively incorporated in India. The facts leading up to the Supreme Court judgement 
have been far less emphasised than the sexual harassment guidelines. The immediate cause for filing a 
petition was the incident of brutal gang rape of a social worker in a village of Rajasthan. However, the 
Court remarked: “That incident is the subject-matter of a separate criminal action and no further mention of 
it, by us, in necessary.”  
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successful lawyers know the value in marshalling the facts since law is nothing sans 
facts.93   
 
Moreover, the issue of sub-standard judging has already been talked of far 
more emotively in moots than the competition itself. Poor quality of judging can be 
frustrating, especially when it wrongly rewards an otherwise unappealing team. Detached 
and under-prepared judges can hamper the mooting experience vastly.94 All this 
reinforces the easy conclusion that judges only decide according to their whims and 
mostly upon their own personal beliefs and biases.95 It is significant to realise that not all 
judges rule according to what they had for breakfast,96 and judicial choices, choices as 
they are, are reached by deploying tools of interpretation and canons of construction in 
augering factual and legal analysis. This lesson is an important one and can be learnt 
through a positive experience with the judges.   
 
Mooting will also significantly benefit with a structured strategising and 
mentoring component to help prepare students with the written and oral submissions. The 
same has to be emphasised for faculty involvement and support. Students often make do 
with unsupervised research and drafting.97 A system of formal feedback is often lacking 
and what the participants get is piecemeal advice from the judges.98 Conducting it as a 
formalised system of assistance and support can fare better in undercutting the 
competitive adversarialism of mooting than in its present hit-or-miss form.  
 
Further, practical legal education aims at improving lawyer competence 
(not just technical competence in professionalising the bar); for moot courts to advance 
this aim, they must be structured as socially and professionally relevant experiences.99 
Professional legal education (especially in a country like India which is continually 
striving to grapple with its myriad socio-economic and political issues) must address the 
public role of law and lawyers in society and must seek to motivate young lawyers to 
                                                 
93Findley, supra note 88, 242.  
94Michael V. Hernandez, In Defense of Moot Court: A Response to “In Praise of Moot Court - Not!”, 17 
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION 69, 84, 85 (1998) (“I have witnessed a fair amount of substandard, even 
atrocious, judging. Some judges are completely unprepared and spend the first several minutes of the 
argument flipping through the problem and bench brief (usually to the detriment of the first advocate’s 
score.”) (“Nothing is more frustrating to a competitor than sensing the judges know nothing about, or have 
a superficial or mistaken understanding of, the relevant cases or statutory provisions.”). 
95Alex Kozinski, Judging Judges’ Ethics, September 15, 2003, available at 
http://notabug.com/kozinski/ethics (Last visited on April 30, 2013). 
96Alex Kozinski, What I Ate For Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LOY. LAL 
REV. 993, 993 (1993) (“It is popular in some circles to suppose that judicial decision making can be 
explained largely by frivolous factors, perhaps for example the relationship between what judges eat and 
what they decide. Answering questions about such relationships is quite simple - it is like being asked to 
write a scholarly essay on the snakes of Ireland: There are none.”). 
97William R. Trail & William D. Underwood, The Decline of Professional Legal Training and a Proposal 
for its Revitalization in Professional Law, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 201, 237 (1996). 
98STURM & GUINIER, supra note 29, 520.  
99BLOCH & PRASAD, supra note 4, 171.  
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work for the public good.100 Indeed, mere analytical skills will not create lawyers 
competent enough to solve broader socio-legal problems. Carrie Menkel-Meadow has 
observed that the tasks envisaged for 21st century lawyers, would require basic 
understanding of socio-economic concepts and statistics to analyse the empirical effects 
of lawmaking and enforcing the law vis-à-vis being a ‘means-ends’ lawyer.101 Therefore, 
a family lawyer must develop counselling skills for working collaboratively with clients 
amidst divorce process and be able to devise conciliatory and innovative methods for 
arranging custodial homes, all within the judicial realm. At the same time, a lawyer 
working with disadvantaged children would have far greater work to do than to know the 
Constitution remarkably, and also engage with the situation on ground, make a genuine 
effort in knowing the NGO/group she is supporting and identify herself as a committed 
participant in the social struggle of disadvantaged groups.  
 
Lastly, in as much as mooting in India is not made a mandatory part of the 
curriculum but remains competitive in the sense that only a few are selected to represent 
universities at national and international moots, it remains an exclusionary, classist 
enterprise, putting a premium on who can learn the art of courtroom,102 a practical aspect 
of a student’s chosen profession.103 A formalised compulsory programme for mooting 
will make for pedagogic equitability in legal education.   
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 
As an initial matter, it must be stressed that law schools can improve their 
training of lawyers.104 However, if a system made to familiarise and popularise the 
judicial process fails to create a pool of dynamic lawyers, it calls for revisiting the 
pedagogic contours of such a system. 105  At the same time, judicial reforms can also be 
initiated in the institutions which are meant to generate its workforce. There must be a 
concerted effort at making the practice of law more inclusive and equitable; to this end 
we must redefine the theorisations around mooting for setting the ground for judicial 
reform.  
                                                 
100See EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE AROUND THE WORLD: LEGAL EDUCATION, LEGAL PRACTICE AND THE 
COMMUNITY (Louise G. Trubek & Jeremy Cooper ed., 1999); Richard J. Wilson, Training for Justice: The 
Global Reach of Clinical Legal Education, 22 PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 421 (2004).  
101Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing from the 
MacCrate Report - of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593, 616 (1994).  
102WILLIAM R. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES 64 
(1978). 
103Bridget J. Crawford, “Daughter of Liberty Wedded to Law”: Gender and Legal Education at the 
University of Pennsylvania Department of Law 1870-1900, 6 JOURNAL OF GENDER RACE AND JUSTICE 131, 
156 (2002). 
104Erwin Chemerinsky, Radical Proposals to Reform Legal Pedagogy: Rethinking Legal Education, 43 
HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 595, 595 (2008).  
105Dr. Manmohan Singh, PM’s Inaugural address at the Conference of National Consultation for Second 
Generation Reforms in Legal Education, May 1, 2010, available at http://pmindia.gov.in/speech-
details.php?nodeid=889 (Last visited on April 30, 2013) (Dr. Manmohan Singh recognized this lacuna and 
thus remarked: “One of the most challenging tasks in legal education in India is to strike a proper balance 
to ensure that our students are taught a fair mix of courses that give them knowledge and training in Indian 
law, but at the same time prepare them for facing the challenges...”). 
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One may think of completely doing away with mooting. Simulations are a 
possible alternative or a useful supplement.106 Other options include conducting oral 
exams107 or substituting moots for interactive law clubs or law societies.108  At the same 
time, one must be wary of narrowing the options: we must now, at the crossroads of legal 
education reform realise the importance of the suite of options for developing practical 
legal skills.109 Whilst we are aware of the drawbacks of mooting, no one-point solution is 
adequate or redeeming. We must endeavour to reconceptualise the moot court paradigm 
to diminish its adversarialism and redefine the ‘best practices’ it ought to instil in the law 
students. At the same time, we must identify the virtues of mooting as a pedagogic tool 
and undertake to realise those while implementing the regime. Furthermore, 
decentralising mooting from law school life (by making it accessible to all) can be 
valuable in ensuring that every student has a practical experience through moots to 
understand the litigious aspect of courtrooms.110 Significantly, we could learn from the 
West through their first-year legal research and writing courses which contain a 
mandatory oral advocacy element.111 By ensuring access we can provide early exposure 
to mooting which is helpful for law students to decide if they wish to be litigators at all, 
rather than embracing or rejecting a choice through an incomplete experience. In 
Pakistan, law schools which in fact replicated the Indian five year B.A/LL.B. model, now 
have mandatory courses in mooting.112  
 
                                                 
106While students often fear the mooting process, both because it causes them to commit to their ideas and 
because they are required to argue on their feet in front of their colleagues, they come to see the value of 
simulation in that it helps them develop their case more thoroughly. Working on simulations over a long 
period as in-class mandatory exercises can be more constructive and valuable in learning. Rolando J. Diaz, 
Cognition, Anxiety, and Prediction of Performance in 1st-Year Law Students, 93 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 420, 
427 (2001).  
107See e.g., Frances C. Fowler, Testing, French Style, 74 CLEARING HOUSE 197, 199 (2001); Barbara M. 
Kehm, Oral Examinations at German Universities, 8 ASSESSMENT EDUCATION 26 (2001). If mooting is 
barely providing an insight into the real world of legal practice, oral exams can do as much as the moots are 
doing in providing students a platform to engage with black letter law, build arguments and pitch for their 
respective positions.  
108See C. Joseph Nuesse, History: The Thrust of Legal Education at the Catholic University of America 
1895-1954, 35 CATH. UL REV. 33 (1985). Although law clubs have very broad agendas, it may be 
worthwhile to explore how the concept can be modelled for building a vital and real link between legal 
education and practice.  
109Dhananjay Mahapatra, Moily, Sibal in Turf War Over Legal Education, THE TIMES OF INDIA September 
20, 2009 available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/india/Moily-Sibal-in-turf-war-over-legal-
education/articleshow/5031709.cms (Last visited on April 30, 2013).  
110The Bar Council initiative of the Four Papers introduced as mandatory since 1998-99 has been a 
significant step toward introducing clinical legal education formally into the curriculum. The papers focus 
mainly on practical training wherein Paper I addresses instruction in litigation skills, and Paper II takes up 
various drafting skills, including pleading and conveyancing. Paper III covers professional matters, such as 
ethics and bar-bench relations. Paper IV includes legal aid work and other aspects of public interest 
lawyering. Although seemingly made mandatory, there are no visible signs of its implementation. 
111See Assoc. of Legal Writing Directors and Legal Writing Institute, Survey Results 7 (2007), available at 
http://www.alwd.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2007-survey-results.pdf (Last visited on November 18, 
2013). 
112Osama Siddique, Martial Law and Lawyers: The Crisis of Legal Education in Pakistan and Key Areas of 
Reform, 5 REGENT J. INT’L L. 95, 116 (2007). 
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In essence, once we start asking the right questions about the goals of 
judicial process and their reification in legal pedagogy, we can recreate valuable legal 
institutions. The popular pedagogic tool of mooting has to be theorised and realised as 
and in relation to all these legal institutions. To this end, all legal persons: the bar, 
academics and professors, and the judiciary ought to share the responsibility for 
providing both the skills and value-oriented legal education to young lawyers entering the 
profession.113  
 
                                                 
113PARASHAR, supra note 1, 96 (exploring if professional versus academic aims of legal education are 
necessarily divergent). 
